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I. INTRODUCTION
In February and March of 1989, a highly publicized insider
trading scandal caused the French to acknowledge serious deficien-
cies in their securities laws.' The previous November, Pechiney (a
conglomerate owned by the French Government) acquired Trian-
gle Industries (a United States corporation) for more than $1.5 bil-
lion.2 A preliminary investigation by the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) revealed an unusual amount of
trading in triangle shares in the days leading up to the acquisi-
tion.' A subsequent report by the French Commission des opera-
tions de bourse (COB) resulted in the indictment of Max Theret, a
financier very close to the Socialist Government, and Roger-Patrice
Pelat, a war hero and confidant of French President Frangois Mit-
terand.4 There was no disclosure, however, of the government in-
siders who assisted Theret and Pelat
5
From their insider trading, Theret and his associates allegedly
made a profit of US$1.48 million, while Pelat and his family pock-
eted US$360,000.6 To be sure, such figures are minute in compari-
son to the profits Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken allegedly made
via insider activity in the United States.7 Nevertheless, when the
French Government failed to charge a single government official
with insider trading violations, the French people were bewildered
and upset. The ensuing political pressures forced the Government
to look closely at French insider trading law and the procedures for
1. Singer, Cherchez largent, From Balzac to Salvador Dali, THE NATION, Mar. 13,
1989, at 333.
2. Id. Triangle Industries was the parent company of American National Can, a re-
nowned packaging company. Id.
3. Id.
4. Cody, Charges Filed Against Friend of Mitterand: Insider Scandal Escalates in
France, Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 1989, at B1, col. 3 [hereinafter Scandal]. Pelat spent so much
time consulting with President Mitterand that presidential aides jokingly referred to Pelat
as "vice president." Cody, Panel Says Mitterand Friend Benefitted From Stock Deal,
Wash. Post, Feb. 1, 1989, at F1.
5. Scandal, supra note 4.




its enforcement.' As one commentator observed, "It's ... indispu-
table that there's going to have to be some toughening up on all
sorts of insider trading . . .because there's an awful lot escaping
through the network."9 French insider trading law was deficient for
a variety of reasons, illustrated by the following facts: 1) French
insider trading law, before the indictment of Theret and Pelat, did
not contain a provision broad enough to encompass tippees;'0 2)
even if COB investigators had conclusively identified a French
Government official who illicitly disclosed the inside information to
Theret and Pelat, the official would have been innocent unless the
prosecutor proved he wrongfully intended to disrupt the normal
workings of the stock market;1 and 3) in the twenty-two years
since France promulgated its first insider trading statute, the Gov-
ernment had filed only a dozen criminal insider trading suits.'2
This Comment examines the piecemeal development of
French insider trading law. First, Section II outlines the United
States methods for regulating insider trading. 3 With the United
States as a reference point, Section III then describes the limited
success of the first French insider trading statute. Next, in Section
IV, the Comment explains and criticizes the 1970 reforms of
French insider trading law. In addition, Section IV analyzes the
French case law that developed subsequent to the 1970 reforms.
Finally, Sections VI and VII study the recent legislative adjust-
ments for earlier statutory deficiencies. By way of conclusion, the
Comment provides several suggestions for future reform.
8. See Neher, France Plans its Own SEC to Police Trading, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 23,
1989, at 3, col. 1; French Watchdog Unit Polices Stock Market, L.A. Times, Oct. 18, 1989,
at D3, col. 3 [hereinafter French Watchdog].
9. Whelan, Scandals and Weak Rules Undermine French Stock Market Ambitions,
Reuter Libr. Rep., Jan. 18, 1989, at 2 (NEXIS, omni library).
10. Theret and Pelat were indicted under Article 17 of Law No. 88-70, passed in 1988.
Law No. 88-70, art. 17 (Jan. 22, 1988), 1988 Journal Officiel de la Rbpublique Fran~aise
[J.O.] 1111, 1988 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, Lggislation [D.S.L.] 134 (adding art. 10-3 to Ordi-
nance No. 67-833 (Sept. 28, 1967), 1967 J.O. 9589, 1967 D.S.L. 373) [hereinafter Article 10-
3].
11. Id.
12. de Mahenge & Persiaux, France, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION 58 (R.
Rosen ed. 1988).
13. The outline of the U.S. insider trading law is particularly appropriate here. The
applicable U.S. statutes and case law have served as the primary inspiration and as constant
points of comparison for the French scheme. See Tunc, Observations, 1976 La Semaine
Juridique (Juris-Classeur Pkriodique) [J.C.P.] II No. 18,329; Tunc, Observations, 1977
J.C.P. II No. 18,543.
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II. UNITED STATES REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING
The United States deals with insider trading through two sec-
tions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,' Section 10(b)' and
Section 16(b)." a Section 16(a) 17 deems directors, officers, and ten
percent (or more) shareholders to be insiders of the corporation
and requires them to file periodic statements with the SEC indi-
cating any changes in their holdings in the corporation.'" With re-
gards to these holdings, Section 16(b) contains a blanket prohibi-
tion: the insiders listed in Section 16(a) cannot retain any profits
from the purchases and sales or sales and purchases made within
six months of each other. 9 The SEC does not have the power to
enforce Section 16(b); it merely compiles and then publishes the
statements. Instead, the issuer itself may bring suit for disgorge-
ment of the profits.2" If the issuer fails to file suit within sixty
days, or does not diligently pursue the suit, any shareholder of the
issuer may file suit on behalf of the corporation. 1 Congress in-
tended Section 16(b) to inhibit officers, directors, or owners of ten
percent or more of the shares from benefiting from inside informa-
tion in the short term. Section 16(b) is particularly effective be-
cause it does not require proof that the insider actually used or
relied on inside information.
2 3
The broad language of Section 10(b) prohibits any person
from employing manipulative or deceptive devices in contravention
of SEC rules.24 Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b) to
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1988).
18. In practice, the corporation's general counsel normally compiles periodic lists of the
insiders' purchases and sales and then files the statements on the insiders' behalf. The in-
sider, however, not the corporate issuer, has the ultimate responsibility for filing ownership
reports. See B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 22 (1979) [here-
inafter RIDER & FFRENCH].
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). The insider must relinquish to the corporation all profits
made on such transactions. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 18, at 22.
23. Id.
24. Section 10(b) provides that it shall be unlawful for any person:
[tlo use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
[Vol. 22:1
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deal specifically with insider trading," is a major catch-all fraud
provision. With respect to the purchase or sale of any security, it is
unlawful for any person to (a) employ any device to defraud, (b)
make any untrue statement of material fact or omit any statement
that affects the interpretation of a material fact, or (c) engage in
any act that involves fraud or deceit."'
As developed by the courts, the general elements of a Rule
10b-5 cause of action are as follows:
27
(1) a non-disclosure,"
(2) of material non-public information,20
(3) made with scienter,30
(4) in breach of a fiduciary duty.'
Furthermore, case law arising under Rule 10b-5 extends the prohi-
bition on insider trading to the tipper-tippee situation. Thus, a tip-
pee is liable for trading where the tipper breaches a fiduciary duty
by giving the information to the tippee, and the tippee knows or
should have known that the tipper has breached the fiduciary
duty.2 A tipper may be liable even if he does not purchase or sell
any of the securities in question. Thus, a tipper would be liable if
he communicates material, non-public information in breach of a
fiduciary duty to a tippee who either trades based on the informa-
tion or tips another.3 3
and regulations as the commission [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(h) (1988).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989).
26. Id.
27. See Bornstein & Dugger, International Regulation of Insider Trading, 2 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 375, 380 (1987).
28. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449-50 (1976); Basic, Inc. v. Levin-
son, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
29. Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 224 (management's interest in timing of non-disclosure is
valid, but not so important as the materiality of the undisclosed information to an inter-
ested investor); Harkaly v. Apparel Indus., 571 F.2d 737, 741 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978).
30. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1976) (language of 10(b) and
10b-5 requires knowing and intentional conduct; private cause of action for damages under
10(b) and lOb-5 will not lie in the absence of an allegation of scienter).
31. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (a duty to disclose arises from a
relationship of trust and confidence; it is the relationship, not the access to material, non-
public information, that gives rise to the duty).
32. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661-63 (1983) (tippee inherits tipper's duty and breach,
so tipper must have a fiduciary duty to the issuer and must breach it for tippee to be liable
under 10b-5).
33. Id. Otherwise, a non-trading tipper could subsequently search out the tippee and
split the profits.
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U.S. securities law also regulates insider trading in varying de-
grees through Rule 14e-3,1' Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933,35 and the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984.36
III. FRENCH LAW - THE 1967 STATUTE
Prior to 1967, French law had no provisions directly address-
ing insider trading.3 7 Nevertheless, Article 419 of the French Penal
Code prohibited the use of fraudulent schemes, such as the circula-
tion of false statements or rumors, to influence supply and demand
in the marketplace.38 The French Government, however, manifest-
ing its laissez faire attitude towards the stock markets, failed to
prosecute any securities traders under Article 419.3' Insider trading
was not only unpunished, it was rampant.4" In fact, the French did
not perceive insider trading as an area of concern; they accepted it
as a traditional practice (a sort of custom) that insiders enjoyed for
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1989). Rule 14e-3, promulgated in 1989 under Section 14(e)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, prohibits material misstatements and non-disclo-
sures and fraudulent or manipulative practices in connection with tender offers. Id.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a) (1988). Section 17(a) is an anti-fraud provision which only ap-
plies to the acts of the seller of securities. Id. It has been used occasionally in insider trading
cases. See, e.g., Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651.
36. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The Act added § 21(d)(2) to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. It did not create a separate basis of liability from Rule 10b-5, but
instead provided the SEC with potent enforcement mechanisms. The SEC may now impose
fines of up to three times the illegal trading profits or losses avoided and may impose addi-"
tional criminal penalties. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u, 78ff (1988).
37. Hawes, Lee & Robert, Insider Trading Law Developments: An International Anal-
ysis, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 335, 341 (1982) [hereinafter Hawes]; Miller, France, in
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION § 7.16[2], at 7-37 (H. Bloo-
menthal ed. 1989).
38. ConE P9NAL [C. PEN] art. 419 (Fr.); see also RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 18, at 234.
39. RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 18, at 232, 234.
40. Id. Of course, the problem was partially attributable to inadequate corporate dis-
closure provisions. Thus, the majority of share trading was based on insufficient informa-
tion, making it difficult to distinguish reliable facts from hyperbolic rumors. Id. at 234. Lack
of conclusive statutory interpretation may account for the remainder of the problem. As
recently as July 1988 a COB report complained that "[tihe present drafting [of French in-
sider trading law] doesn't, in our view, allow us to draw with certainty a precise line between
legal and illegal." French Watchdog, supra note 8. The head of the COB explained, "By
definition, financial markets are markets of insider traders (given the constant flow of price-
sensitive data within the stock exchange). Insider trading isn't a question of essence, but
one of degree." Id. The line between "inside" and "open and notorious" information is per-
haps obscured in France because there have been so few judicial decisions concerning in-
sider trading (a dozen as of January 1989). See de Mahenge & Persiaux, supra note 12. In
contrast, the United States has been able to develop the concept through case law, in the
tradition of stare decisis.
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their own benefit, and for that of friends and relatives.' As a re-
sult, the average Frenchman held a cynical, albeit complacent,
opinion of the French capital markets.42 Starting in 1967, in an at-
tempt to foster the confidence of non-institutional investors in the
French securities markets, the French Government commenced an
attack on insider trading.'3
The Ordonnance of 28 September 1967 (the "1967 Ordi-
nance"), in addressing the offense of insider trading for the first
time, created the COB." Originally, the 1967 Ordinance focused
exclusively on disclosure, thus closely following the SEC 'provisions
that inspired it." Article 162-1 of the 1967 Ordinance required
that the stipulated insiders'6 disclose any securities transactions
within six days of the transaction."7 The COB would subsequently
compile and publish a public record of insider activity.' 8 The Gov-
ernment intended these public records to deter insider trading by
disclosing corrupt insiders to their peers." Believing that the dis-
closure of unethical practices would arouse public hostility and
shame, the Government assumed professional organizations and/or
the corporations themselves would call for the dismissal of the
41. Tunc, A French Lawyer Looks at American Corporation Law and Securities Regu-
lation, 130 U. PENN. L. REV. 757, 759 (1982).
42. RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 18, at 234. "The poor reputation that the French
capital markets have enjoyed has been a direct result of secretiveness and probable self-
interest of corporations and their controllers." Id. One French broker recently explained,
"Until Paris markets are really cleaned up, we're going to have a hard time establishing
ourselves as credible, trustworthy players." Rossant & Comes, The Paris Bourse Calls in the
Gendarmes, Bus. WK., Mar. 28, 1988, at 41. The credibility of the Paris markets is of partic-
ular in~portance today, as Paris competes for capital with London, Zurich, Frankfurt, and
the other major European money centers. Id. But, as Barry Gillman, managing director of
Prudential-Bache Global Funds observes, institutional investors recently have had to con-
tend with much bigger insider trading scandals in New York, London, and Tokyo. Neher,
supra note 8.
43. RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 18, at 233. The Government focused its efforts on
those traders in privileged positions. Id.
44. Ordinance No. 67-833 (Sept. 28, 1967), 1967 J.O. 9589, 1967 D.S.L. 373 (amending
Law No. 66-537 (July 24, 1966), 1966 J.0. 6402, 1966 D.S.L. 265) [hereinafter 1967
Ordinance].
45. Miller, supra note 37, § 7.16[1], at 7-37.
46. The "stipulated insiders" of a corporation included the following: the president,
general managers, and members of the boards of the company; the legal and natural persons
in the corporation who exercise the functions of administrators; members of the supervisory
board; and permanent representatives of persons who exercise any of the aforementioned
functions. 1967 Ordinance, supra note 44, art. 8 (adding art. 162-1 to Law No. 66-537 (July
24, 1966), 1966 J.O. 6402, 1966 D.S.L. 265).
47. Id.; see RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 18, at 234.
48. RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 18, at 234.
49. Id.
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crooked insiders.50
Nevertheless, French law did not prohibit insider trading per
se. Indeed, an insider could trade at will as long as he or she re-
ported the transactions to the COB. The courts were empowered to
impose criminal sanctions and forfeiture of profits only on those
insiders who failed to report a trade."
The reporting obligation produced a flood of insider reports
that the COB, with its very small staff,52 was incapable of han-
dling."5 By 1969, the COB openly admitted that it had been unable
to monitor most of the reports.54 To make matters worse, the COB
also admitted that it was incapable of investigating the increasing
number of insiders that were ignoring the reporting obligations
altogether. 5
Eventually, the COB used the power granted to it under its
organic statute6 to submit proposals to the Government for
50. Id.
51. Hawes, supra note 37, at 342.
52. Originally, the COB staff comprised only forty persons, four of whom were actual
inspectors, all crammed into several rooms in the suburbs of Paris. Bezard, Le Nouveau
Visage'de la Commission des Op~rations de Bourse, 1989 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
COMPAR9 929, 932.
53. Miller, supra note 37; RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 18, at 235.
54. RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 18, at 235. The COB suspected insiders, striving to
bury the agency in paper, filed many superfluous reports of insignificant trades. Hawes,
supra note 37, at 342.
In its original form, Article 162-1 of the 1967 Ordinance closely resembled Section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, because it stipulated that statutory insiders were
obliged to report their securities transactions to the market regulator, the COB. The COB,
like the SEC under Section 16(b), then published lists of the transactions, and the onus was
on the issuer to take action against the insider.
There were also important differences. For one, Section 16(b) provided the additional
rule that the insider must return to the issuing corporation any profits made on the pro-
scribed transactions, while Article 162-1 lacked any similar requirement. As such, Article
162-1 did not provide a cause of action. 1967 Ordinance, supra note 44; see RIDER &
FFRENCH, supra note 18, at 234.
Article 162-1 differed from Section 16(b) in two other important ways. First, the COB
had only about 40 persons to analyze the lists and investigate insider activity. See Bezard,
supra note 52. In comparison, the present SEC work force totals over 2,000 persons and has
the benefit of modern technology. Neher, supra note 8. Second, the COB required the re-
porting and publication of all securities transactions by insiders. 1967 Ordinance, supra
note 44, art. 8 (adding art. 162-1 to Law No. 66-537 (July 24, 1966), 1966 J.O. 6402, 1966
D.S.L. 265). In contrast, Section 16(b) requires the U.S. insider to report only those securi-
ties transactions where he is a statutory insider of the issuer(s). See supra notes 18-22 and
accompanying text. Thus, the SEC is charged with monitoring comparatively fewer reports
than was the COB under Article 162-1.
55. RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 18, at 235.
56. 1967 Ordinance, supra note 44, art. 4.
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amending legislation.5" The COB recommended the abandonment
of the disclosure approach in favor of a complete prohibition on
insider trading56 The French Parliament concurred with the
COB's recommendation and, in December 1970, adopted legisla-
tion making insider trading a crime.
IV. THE 1970 CHANGES
A. The Legislation
The Law of 23 December 197059 (the "1970 Statute") com-
pletely abandoned the disclosure approach, marking a new era in
French insider trading regulation. 0 The 1970 Statute consists of
three major parts: 1) a provision that certain insiders must hold
their securities in a manner easily verifiable by the COB; 1 2) the
criminalization of the act of insider trading;6 2 and 3) the criminal-
ization of the use of false or misleading information to influence
the price of a security."
The 1970 Statute's entirely revised version of Article 162-1
("Revised Article 162-1") redefines the initi~s internes as directors
and certain officers of a company, their permanent representatives
57. Delmas-Marty, Le 'dflit des initi's' va-t-il changer la bourse?, 1977 RECUEIL DAL-
LOZ-SIREY, CHRONIQUES [D.S. Chr.] I 91, 92 n.13.
58. Hawes, supra note 37, at 342. French commentators have criticized the COB and
the Government for the abandonment of the disclosure approach, identifying it as a sign of
"ignominious" defeat and as evidence of insufficient government interest in providing the
COB with adequate resources. RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 18, at 235. But, as J. Don-
nendieu de Vabre, then President of the COB, explained, "When one considers that the only
result of the Herculean task of [monitoring insider trading] was to require further disclosure
of operations without sanctioning the insider for the operations themselves, it is readily
understandable why the COB requested a change in the law." Address by J. Donnendieu de
Vabre, Second International Securities Law Conference (Apr. 3-4, 1975), reprinted in MUL-
TINATIONAL APPROACHES - CORPORATE INSIDERS 41, 43 (L. Loss ed. 1975). Perhaps if the origi-
nal Article 162-1 had provided a cause of action for the issuer's shareholders against the
insider for disgorgement of profits to the corporation (as Section 16(b) contains), the law
would have hindered French insiders to a greater extent and the COB would have felt less
frustrated.
59. Law No. 70-1208 (Dec. 23, 1970), 1970 J.O. 11,981, 1971 D.S.L. 17 [hereinafter 1970
Statute].
60. Id. art. 4 (adding art. 10-1 to 1967 Ordinance, supra note 44) [hereinafter Article
10-1]. Excluding a few instances, all subsequent French legislation regulating insider trading
has added to, rather than changed, the 1970 Statute.
61. Id. art. 1 (replacing 1967 Ordinance, supra note 44, art. 8 with a revised version of
art. 162-1) [hereinafter Revised Article 162-1].
62. Article 10-1, supra note 60.
63. Id.
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(e.g., accountants and attorneys), their spouses (unless separated
under judicial decree), and their unemancipated minor children.6 '
These insiders must hold their shares in nominative form"6 or, if
they hold any shares in bearer form, they must deposit such shares
in a bank. 6 If the initi~s internes deposit the bearer form securi-
ties in a bank,"' they must give notice of the deposit to the COB.",
Revised Article 162-1 applies both to listed and unlisted securities
issued by any corporation with which the insider is affiliated (in-
cluding the primary corporation's subsidiary, parent, or parent
subsidiary).6 9 Failure to comply results in a significant fine."0
Under the 1970 Statute, Article 10-1, paragraph 1 ("Article 10-
1(1)") directly criminalizes the act of insider trading.7 1 Article 10-
1(1) adds a new category of insiders: the "initi~s externes,"'' i.e.,
all other persons "who have at their disposal while exercising their
professional functions privileged information on the technical,
commercial, or financial circumstances and operations of a com-
64. Revised Article 162-1, supra note 61.
65. In France, most shares and debentures are in bearer form, thereby hindering the
COB's ability to ascertain a shareholder's identity. This is a result of a long-standing tradi-
tion of secrecy in business matters. Miller, supra note 37, § 7.09[3], at 7-28. The use of
bearer form securities makes it difficult to inform security holders of new developments in
the corporation. The COB has addressed this problem by developing guidelines for compa-
nies which wish to use the press to disclose information to the public at large. Id. Still, one
must consider whether the prevalent use of bearer form securities contributes to the dispar-
ity between the general public's information and the information accessible to insiders. Such
a result further blurs the distinction between confidential and non-confidential information
in France. See supra note 40.
66. Revised Article 162-1, supra note 61. The insiders are under an obligation to ensure
that they place all securities covered by Article 162-1 into nominative form or into a deposi-
tory within one month of assuming insider status. Decree No. 71-615, art. 1 (July 23, 1971),
1971 J.O. 7363, 1971 D.S.L. 327 (adding art. 153-1, to Decree No. 67-236 (Mar. 23, 1967),
1967 J.O. 2843, 1967 D.S.L. 137). Furthermore, where the insiders have assumed insider
status before acquiring the securities, they are obliged to transfer the securities into nomi-
native form or into a depository within twenty days. Id. (adding art. 153-2).
67. The bank or financial institution must be registered with the Conseil National de
Credit, a government agency. The deposits may also be placed with a registered agent de
change (stockbroker). Decree No. 71-615, art. 1 (July 23, 1971), 1971 J.O. 7363, 1971 D.S.L.
327 (adding art. 153-1, to Decree No. 67-236 (Mar. 23, 1967), 1967 J.O. 2843, 1967 D.S.L.
137).
68. Revised Article 162-1, supra note 61.
69. Id.
70. Law No. 66-537, art. 485 (Jul. 24, 1966), 1966 J.O. 6402, 1966 D.S.L. 265, as modi-
fied by 1967 Ordinance, supra note 44, art. 11.
71. Article 10-1, supra note 60, para. 1 [hereinafter Article 10-1(1)].
72. French legislation does not actually use the terms "initits internes" or "initis ex-
ternes" to refer to insiders. These terms are used by French commentators and courts to
distinguish between the two categories of insiders as defined by French law.
FRENCH INSIDER TRADING
pany."" Both groups of insiders (initi~s internes and initi~s ex-
ternes) are forbidden to carry out, either by themselves or through
intermediaries, any securities transaction which exploits privileged
information before that information becomes available to the gen-
eral public.7 4 The 1970 Statute subjects a violator of Article 10-1(1)
to a prison term ranging from two months to two years and/or a
fine of up to four times the profits realized.
7
Meanwhile, Article 10-1, paragraph 2 ("Article 10-1(2)") im-
poses criminal penalties upon anyone who knowingly disseminates
false or misleading information about a corporation in order to in-
fluence the conditions of the securities markets.7 6 This prohibition
primarily aims at preventing two practices: 1) where journalists or
syndicates circulate false or inflammatory reports on certain issu-
ers and then trade on the impact of their reports"7 and 2) where
company managers communicate to the public over-optimistic in-
formation, in order to provoke an artificial rise in the stock's value
and, in turn, facilitate the issuing of additional shares.7" Under Ar-
ticle 10-1(2), the Government need not show that the author of the
untrue statement actually benefitted from the statement; a wrong-
ful intention to influence the market is sufficient.
7 9
Remarkably, Article 10-1(2) has not yet been applied,80 appar-
ently due to the difficulty in fulfilling the scienter - or wrongful
73. Article 10-1(1), supra note 71.
74. Id.
75. Id. As an alternative to the four times profits penalty, the statute establishes mini-
mum and maximum guidelines of FF5,000 and FF5 million respectively. Id.
76. Id. para. 2 [hereinafter Article 10-1(2)]. Violators of 10-1(1) and 10-1(2) are subject
to the same criminal penalties.
77. RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 18, at 235.
78. de Mahenge & Persiaux, supra note 12, at 56. The Government, however, did not
intend to place a duty on directors to correct rumors and false information. RIDER &
FFRENCH, supra note 18, at 235.
79. Article 10-1(2), supra note 76; RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 18, at 235.
80. In Socit& "La Comrnmande Electrique," the sole case to date involving Article 10-
1(2), La Commande Electrique (LCE), a French publicly-traded company, brought suit
against Editions Boursifres, a company that provided both financial information and a ser-
vice for exchange of financial information between subscribers through a computer network.
Judgment of July 5, 1988, Trib. gr. inst., Paris. - Recueil Dalloz Sirey, Jurisprudence [D.S.
Jur.] _. LCE's share price had plunged after Editions Boursires' exchange service showed
several erroneous reports that LCE's major supplier was terminating its contract. LCE
brought suit under Article 10-1(2) claiming that Editions Boursibres had either authored or
been an accomplice to the dissemination of false or misleading information with an intent to
destroy LCE's share price. The court held, however, that although someone had dissemi-
nated false information with the requisite intent, there was no proof that Editions Bour-
sibres had done anything but provide the vehicle for dissemination.
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intention - requirement."' This has discouraged both commenta-
tors (who view Article 10-1(2) as the only provision capable of reg-
ulating securities fraud in France)82 and victims (who would like to
attach their civil claims to successful criminal ones).8 3
B. The Case Law
Since the promulgation of the 1970 Statute, only. a dozen in-
sider trading cases have reached the courts."4 French courts have
referred to past decisions in order to clarify the ambiguities arising
under the French insider trading statutes.8 5
1. The Level Playing Field
In X . . . Otis Europe/Otis Elevator,8 6 "X," the chief execu-
tive officer of the European joint venture of Otis Elevator, Inc.,
flew to the United States to convince Otis to take over B.D.R., one
of the joint venture's other shareholders. Just before leaving, X
81. Miller, supra note 37, § 7.16[6], at 7-41. Article 10-1(2) requires the State to prove
1) the initii knowingly disseminated false or misleading information and 2) this was done
with the intent to influence market conditions where the securities are traded. Id. In con-
trast, a prosecutor in an Article 10-1(1) case need only prove the trader possessed inside
knowledge and that he made transactions while in the possession of that knowledge. Id. at
7-42.
Still, Article 10-1(2), with its "fraud on the market" emphasis, appears more reasonable
than the Rule lOb-5 analysis adopted in Carpenter v. United States, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.
1986), aff'd 484 U.S. 19 (1987), where the Court of Appeals held that a Wall Street Journal
reporter was guilty of violating Rule 10b-5. The reporter leaked information to tippees who
traded on the predicted market impact of the reporter's upcoming securities column. The
Second Circuit found that the reporter had a duty to the newspaper, had breached that
duty, and had thereby potentially harmed the newspaper's reputation. The Supreme Court
split on the issue of whether this constituted a proper application of 10b-5, and therefore
affirmed.
The Supreme Court's split decision acknowledged that the Second Circuit, aspiring to
regulate the deceptive or unfair use of inside information, may have forced a roundabout
interpretation of Rule 10b-5. Carpenter focused on the reporter's breaching a fiduciary duty
to the Journal, even though Journal stock was not among those traded based on the re-
porter's tips. Article 10-1(2), meanwhile, is a more directly worded statute that avoids the
10b-5 duty/breach conundrum. Article 10-1(2) would have directed the court to the truly
essential question: did the reporter disclose the information with the wrongful intent of
influencing conditions of the securities markets?
82. See Miller, supra note 37, § 7.16161, at 7-42.
83. Id.
84. de Mahenge & Persiaux, supra note 12.
85. The cases do not cite previous decisions. However, they often use the exact lan-
guage used in previous cases in order to describe certain judicially created doctrines or
definitions.
86. Judgment of Oct. 29, 1975, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 1976 D.S. Jur. 53.
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placed an order for FF71,179 worth of B.D.R.'s securities. After
several days of negotiations in the United States, X returned to
Paris, where the takeover announcement catapulted the price of
B.D.R.'s shares.
The court first determined that X was in fact an initi6 externe
- in possession, through the course of his profession, of confiden-
tial information concerning the technical, commercial or financial
management of B.D.R. - within the scope of Article 10-1(1). 87 The
court further held that the material element of the crime was X's
use of confidential information while trading.88 X argued that the
court should imply a scienter requirement in Article 10-1(1).'9 He
claimed that French legislators used the word "exploitS," or ex-
ploit, as a link between "confidential information" and "transac-
tion" in order to create a criminal intent requirement.90 That is, X
claimed that exploitk requires the prosecutor to prove that X in-
tended to use the information for the illegal purpose of gaining an
unfair financial advantage on the stock exchange."1 This interpre-
tation would have considerably narrowed the scope of Article 10-
1(1). The court, however, rejected X's interpretation. The court ex-
plained that Article 10-1(1), unlike Article 10-1(2), explicitly
avoids the word "scienter." 2 Accordingly, the court ruled that Ar-
ticle 10-1(1) does not require showing the trader acted with the
specific intent to defraud the market and recovered a dishonest fi-
nancial gain."3 Rather, the mere possession of inside information
regarding a company while trading in that company's securities is
sufficient to prove the insider "exploited" the information. 4 The
87. Id. X argued that he was outside the scope of Article 10-1(1) because he was not a
statutory insider. X claimed that because he was CEO of a company other than the one in
which he bought shares, he was not an initi6 interne under Revised Article 162-1. The court
explained that X was an initi externe, since X was the sole inspiration of Otis Elevator's
takeover of B.D.R. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. X's possession of confidential information on the financial state of B.D.R. was
indisputable; after all, he was the primary instigator of its takeover.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
93. This standard, although somewhat controversial among commentators at the time,
governed subsequent judicial decisions. See Judgment of Oct. 15, 1976, Trib. gr. inst., Paris,
1978 D.S. Jur. 381 note at 385 J. Guy~not. One commentator correctly noted that Article 10-
1(1) clearly states that a violator could be fined up to four times the profits "if profits were
realized." Judgment of Oct. 29, 1975, 1976 D.S. Jur. 53 note at 56 M. Delmas-Marty.
94. Pursuing a monetary profit is not an element of Article 10-1(1). Inside information
can be used for other purposes. In the Otis Elevator case, for example, X's acquisition of a
large number of B.D.R. shares before the takeover permitted him to become an officer of
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legislature intended the statute to reach any insider who knowingly
uses privileged information in his market calculations.
The court in X. . . Otis Europe/Otis Elevator justified its de-
cision on the following policy grounds: "X acted with full aware-
ness, in defrauding the regular game of the securities market and
in breaking the necessary equality between all its clients by his
illicit action."90 Thus, the court implied a moral element in the
statute. The crime was not that X made, or intended to make, a
profit using inside information. Rather, the crime was that X tilted
an otherwise level playing field in his advantage through his use of
inside information.
9
2. The "Complete Abstention" Doctrine
Subsequent case law developed the doctrine of "complete ab-
stention" as a means of maintaining a "level playing field.""s
Under this interpretation of Article 10-1(1), any initi , whether in-
terne or externe, may buy or sell the securities of any company, so
long as the initi6 does not possess knowledge of inside information
about that company that is not known to the company's sharehold-
ers and the general public."
B.D.R. at the time of the takeover and thereafter. Judgment of Oct. 29, 1975, 1976 D.S. Jur.
at 55.
95. Id. See also Judgment of Mar. 30, 1979, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 1980 La Semaine
Juridique (Juris-Classeur P~riodique) [J.C.P.] II No. 19,306 (1st case) note A. Tunc ("The
absence of speculative intent invoked as a defense by the defendant is inconsequential; it is
sufficient that, by his illicit action, [the defendant] broke the equality that must exist be-
tween all those speculating in the stock market so that the interplay of the offer and the
demand determines the stock price").
96. This rationale parallels the original impetus for France's insider trading laws: to
inspire the average Frenchman's confidence in the stock markets. See supra notes 42-45 and
accompanying text. That principle frequently justifies French insider trading reforms. Ac-
cordingly, in the mid-1980s, the French Government took other steps to promote small-
investor confidence in the markets. The Government "privatized" several large national
banks and companies, undervaluing the shares sold to the general public (in order to guar-
antee the small investor an immediate profit) and placing severe restrictions on the number
of shares any one investor could buy (so that the large institutional investors could not buy
all the shares of a particular company). de Jonquieres, Best-Seller with a Choice of End-
ings; Privitisation in Europe, Fin. Times, Sept. 10, 1986, § 1, at 24, col. 5.
97. Judgment of May 26, 1977, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1978 D.S. Jur. 379.
98. Id. Unlike U.S. case law, which focuses on the knowledge or disclosure to those on
the other end of a particular transaction, the French doctrine focuses on whether the infor-
mation has been disclosed to all potential buyers and all potential sellers. Compare SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969) (all facts necessary to make an informed judgment must be disclosed to those on the
other end of the transaction) with Judgment of Jan. 28, 1985, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 1985 D.S.
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The first case to espouse this doctrine was D . . .Compagnie
Francaise denterprise,9 a case involving D, a former C.E.O. of a
public works corporation. D suffered a drastic salary cut due to a
demotion, but he remained privy to inside information. D thereby
learned that the corporation's ventures in Morocco lost FF22 mil-
lion more than previously estimated.100 D sold his shares long
before the information became public.' 0 ' Upon the public release
of the information seven months later, the share price dipped to
under half D's selling price102
The trial court held that since D's bank had requested that D
sell his shares in the corporation, it was unclear that D had used
the insider information in his decision to enter into the transac-
tion.103 Consequently, the trial court dismissed the State's charges
against D, because the court could not conclude D had exploited
the information.'04
Jur. 357 note J.P. Marchi (if the information has not been publicly disclosed, then the initi
is under a duty to abstain from trading in the market).
99. Judgment of May 26, 1977, 1978 D.S. Jur. at 379.
100. Id.
101. The financial press generally continued to proclaim that the operation was in
sound financial condition until the official announcement of the loss seven months later.
One specialized financial daily, however, repeatedly issued general warnings about the cor-
poration's financial state around the time of D's sale of his shares. Id. at 380. The court of
appeals confronted the issue of whether the financial daily's reports transformed the infor-
mation into public knowledge. The court of appeals held that such pessimistic, fragmented,
and incomplete statements were not of the requisite character to achieve the transforma-
tion. Id. Poron, a 1985 case, had a more expansive holding on this issue. Judgment of Jan.
28, 1985, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 1985 D.S. Jur. 357; see infra notes 122-38 and accompanying
text.
102. Judgment of May 26, 1977, 1978 D.S. Jur. at 379.
103. Judgment of Dec. 19, 1975, 1976 J.C.P. II No. 18,329 (2d case). Since D owed the
bank approximately FF45,310, the bank pressed D to maintain a diversified portfolio of
stocks to guaranty his debt. Judgment of May 26, 1977, 1978 D.S. Jur. at 380. After D's
salary had been cut in third by his demotion, he sold much of his existing stock in the
corporation thereby making cash available for the purchase of a diversified portfolio. Id.
Furthermore, D claimed that he first had offered to sell his shares to one of his superiors in
the corporation, and subsequently consulted with an attorney to see if French law required
him to file a notice with the COB before selling his shares. Id.
104. The trial court held that the phrase "exploitation of privileged information," as
contained in Article 10-1(1), "could only mean the abusive use of such information for per-
sonal gain." This constituted a departure from the same court's position in X . . . Otis
Europe/ Otis Elevator that the mere possession of inside information regarding a company
in whose securities the insider is trading constitutes sufficient proof that the insider ex-
ploited the information. Such departure was heavily criticized by French legal critics who
believed that, even if the statutory term "exploitation" was somewhat ambiguous, all insid-
ers should be forbidden from trading while in the possession of inside information. Tunc,
Observations, 1976 J.C.P. 11 No. 18,329.
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The court of appeals reversed, using its fact-finding powers10
to discover that D's wife had a substantial stock portfolio, the prof-
its from which could have easily guaranteed D's debts.1"" Thus, ac-
cording to the court of appeals, D had not entered the transaction
under the "most pressing necessity.' ' 0  The court held that D's ac-
tions were criminal because he sold securities while in the posses-
sion of important, undisclosed information relating to those securi-
ties.108 The court's decision implied a presumption of illegality vis-
a-vis any transaction involving an insider who trades securities
about which he retains material, undisclosed information. Al-
though the court recognized the possibility of mitigating circum-
stances, such as the "most pressing necessity" exception, it was
willing to go to great lengths (e.g., appellate level fact finding) to
avoid an actual application of the exception. Since considerable
facts are necessary to show the most pressing necessity, an insider
is under a general obligation to completely abstain (hence, the
"complete abstention doctrine") 10 9 from transactions where he has
any inside information relating to the subject securities."'
Until the statutory changes adopted in 1983,11 D... Compa-
gnie Francaise d'enterprise constituted the definitive judicial in-
terpretation of the term "exploit6," as used in Article 10-1(1). De-
spite perfunctory challenges to such judicial interpretation by
insider trading defendants, the "complete abstention doctrine" was
105. In most civil law countries, the appellate courts can perform fact-finding functions.
See Capalli, Comparative South American Civil Procedure: A Chilean Perspective, 21 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 239, 286 (1990). Since civil law countries tend to discount wit-
nesses and rely almost exclusively on documentary evidence, the appellate courts need not
interview witnesses; they merely open up the record to the submission of additional docu-
ments. Id. at 272.
106. Judgment of May 26, 1977, 1978 D.S. Jur. at 380.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See also P .. . CarrefourlAtlobroge, Judgment of Oct. 15, 1976, Trib. gr. inst.,
Paris, 1978 D.S. Jur. 383 ("If the law did not create an interdiction which resulted in a
permanent obstacle to managing a stock portfolio, it had at any rate an effect of imposing
on all insiders an obligation to abstain [from trading] during the period preceding the dis-
closure of the information to the public ....1").
110. The court, in holding that D's situation was not one of "most pressing necessity,"
failed to elaborate a definition of what kind of situations would satisfy the exception. Pre-
sumably, if an initii could show that he was going bankrupt and needed to liquify his shares
in the corporation about which he held inside information, the courts would not convict him
of a crime. Since the D . . .Compagnie Francaise d'enterprise case, no appellate courts
have revisited the "most pressing necessity" exception, hence it probably represents the
current state of the law. Miller, supra note 37, § 7.16[3], at 7-39.
111. See infra notes 177-91 and accompanying text.
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reconfirmed by the French legislature in 1983.
3. Privileged Information
a. Public Disclosure
The original version' of Article 10-1(1) broadly defined in-
side information as any "privileged information on the technical,
commercial or financial operations of a company.""' 3 French courts
have carried the burden of elucidating Article 10-1(1)'s cryptic
definition.
In Saint-Guilhem,"4 a financial journalist purchased stock in
two companies after he had interviewed their officers, but before
he published the information. The journalist sold the stock after
his news reports caused an increase in the share prices of the re-
spective companies. The court found the journalist to be an initil
externe guilty of using inside information gained in the course of
his profession." 6 The information was privileged because it had
not penetrated public knowledge at the time the journalist bought
the securities."' In other cases, however, the COB declined to
prosecute stock buyers who authored or inspired news reports and
then traded on the predictable effect of such reports." 7 The COB
found that although such a practice violated the ethical canons of
journalism,"' the information was publicly accessible before publi-
cation of the reports. Thus, the information was not privileged,
and the news reporters/securities traders had not violated French
112. In 1983, the French Legislature amended the statutory definition of inside infor-
mation. See infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
113. Article 10-1(1), supra note 71.
114. Judgment of May 12, 1976, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 1976 J.C.P. II No, 18,496 (1st
case).
115. Id.
116. Id. Hence, when the court determined that the journalist had no access to inside
information concerning two other companies about which he wrote articles, the court re-
fused to punish the journalist for trading in the securities of those two companies. The
critical difference in the two sets of transactions was that in the first two instances, the
journalist bought the companies' shares while in possession of information to which the
general public had no access until the articles were published; in those transactions that
went unpunished, the journalist merely used information easily obtainable by the public at
large.
117. COMMISSION DES OPtsRATIONS DE BOURSE, NEUViME RAPPORT AU PR9SIDENT DE LA
REPUBLIQUE 87 (1976).
118. The COB's policy was to inform the directors of the implicated publications, leav-




The courts in D . .. Compagnie Francaise d'enterprise,
20
Caudrelier-Bnac2' and Poron'22 further defined "privileged infor-
mation." In D . . . Compagnie Francaise d'enterprise, the former
CEO sold his shares based on confidential information about his
company's losses. Around the same time, a small daily financial
journal with limited circulation published some vague disclosures
regarding the losses.12 5 The court of appeals held that the journal's
statements were too vague, fragmented, and incomplete to remove
the privileged label from the CEO's information. 24
In Caudrelier-B~nac, the court examined the following ques-
tion: At what point can confidential information be imputed to a
company's executive without actually proving that he received
such information? In this case, the executive had placed orders to
sell his shares in the company before an internal meeting where
the company officially informed its executives of substantial com-
pany losses.'2 5 The prosecution proved that the executive may
have had access to the information before he placed his orders to
sell, that he could have deduced from various internal indicators
that the company was about to absorb heavy losses, and that the
executive had no other motive to sell the shares except to avoid
losing money from the subsequent drop in share price. 2 ' Never-
theless, the court held that because the prosecution could not show
the exact conversation or paper which informed the executive of
the losses, such confidential information could not be imputed to
119. Id. If the information is not privileged, then Article 10-1(1) does not attach. Addi-
tionally, the news reporters did not violate Article 10-1(2), because that law applies only to
the dissemination of false or misleading information about the technical, commercial, or
financial operations of a company. The news stories in question were accurate representa-
tions of non-confidential information and were neither false nor misleading in any way. Id.
Presumably, the French Parliament adopted Article 10-3, supra note 10, to rectify, in-
ter alia, this situation. That statute subjects anyone who intentionally tries to interfere with
the normal operations of the stock market "through the deception of another" to the same
penalties as Article 10-1(1). Proving the reporter/buyer actually deceived a seller, however,
would be extremely difficult where the reporter did not possess any more privileged or confi-
dential information than did the buyer. Therefore, as it pertains to the news reporter cases,
Article 10-3 is probably not a substantial improvement.
120. Judgment of May 26, 1977, 1978 D.S. Jur. at 380.
121. Judgment of Mar. 17, 1976, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 1976 J.C.P. 11 18,496 (2d case).
122. Judgment of Jan. 28, 1985, 1985 D.S. Jur. at 357.
123. See supra note 101.
124. Judgment of May 26, 1977, 1978 D.S. Jur. at 380.
125. Judgment of Mar. 17, 1976, 1976 J.C.P. II No. 18,496 (2d case) note A. Tunc.
126. Id.
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The Poron court clarified the standard for determining when
information loses the "privileged" label.128 Poron was an executive
with the corporation Centre Est Distribution Succursaliste
(Cedis).'29 In a private meeting that Poron attended, the CEO of
Cedis announced an 11.75% increase in turnover and 33% increase
in dividends over the previous year. 130 Poron and his immediate
family bought FF191,050 worth of Cedis stock before a press con-
ference was called to announce the dividend. 13'
In response to insider trading charges, Poron argued that the
information was no longer privileged when he bought the shares."3 2
In making his argument, Poron cited two news reports. The first
report, published two months before his purchase, discussed the
possibility of the Cedis stock price rising due to its admission to
the futures market. The second report, published the day of the
127. Id. Andr& Tunc, the noted French commentator, ridiculed the court's holding, re-
marking that the French dictionary defines the word "information", inter alia, as a group of
significant indicators and that it is ridiculous to expect French prosecutors to assemble more
proof than that which existed in Caudrelier-Bnac. As Tunc explained, prosecutors cannot
always find colleagues of a business executive to testify that they saw him receive confiden-
tial information which he is accused of using illicitly. Id.
French courts, however, have continued to require specific proof that the insider re-
ceived the confidential information. In C . . . and B . . . Soci&6t Thomson, the court dis-
missed the charges against two insiders for absence of such specific proof. Judgment of May
13, 1986, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, - D.S. Jur. - . C was an engineer in the French Ministry of
Defense and was heavily involved in the French arms sales negotiations with Saudi Arabia.
For seven months, C had been divesting his investment portfolio of shares in Thomson
C.F.S., a French multinational which manufactures, among other things, high tech arms. On
January 12, 1984, C attended a Defense Ministry meeting at which a significant contract
between Thomson and the Saudi Government was announced. He left the meeting, can-
celled his remaining sell order, and requested that his broker buy five to six thousand shares
of Thomson. The court dismissed the charges against C, however, because C proved that he
had entered the meeting after the announcement and the prosecutor could present no other
proof of a specific instance where C was told or read about the contract before it was made
public on January 18, 1984.
With respect to B, a head-hunter with high level contacts in Thomson, the prosecutor
showed that between January 9th and 12th, B had bought 11,450 shares in Thomson for a
total of FF4.5 million. Furthermore the prosecutor presented evidence that B had called a
high level Thomson executive on January 12th asking him to confirm the existence of the
contract. Nevertheless, the court held that the call was placed after B had placed his orders
to buy Thomson shares and that knowledge of the contract could not therefore be imputed
to B at the time of the purchase.






private meeting, predicted a 15% increase in profits and dividend
for Cedis.
133
The court held that the news stories contained uncertain and
hypothetical information. 134 Such a disclosure, although public,
was insufficient to remove the "privileged" label from the informa-
tion released at the Cedis meeting. 135 The vast difference between
the second report's estimated dividend (15%) and the actual an-
nounced dividend (33%) proved the uncertainty.136 The court enu-
merated a standard for such situations: the publishing of informa-
tion cannot strip that information of its confidential nature unless
the report satisfies the COB's required formalities for informing
shareholders.1 3 7 The consequences of the court's standard are far-
reaching; French insiders are likely to retain an extraordinary
amount of information that has penetrated the public domain but
has not entered a COB-approved report to shareholders. 8 Conse-
quently, this standard profoundly restricts insiders.
b. Ripeness: The What and When of "Privileged
Information"
A recurrent issue in defining privileged information is the
quality and ripeness of the information which the initis retain
while trading. If an insider is privy to a rumor about a company's






137. Id. at 359. The COB has established an elaborate array of standards for corporate
disclosure to shareholders. Miller, supra note 37, § 7.09[2], at 7-28.
138. On one hand, the court's strong standard should have some perverse effects. If the
court's words are taken literally, non-insiders who undertake extensive research on issuing
companies would be able to trade on the basis of that information before the issuer pub-
lished it according to COB guidelines; yet equally well-prepared initi~s, whether internes or
externes, would be unable to engage in the same trades.
On the other hand, such a standard provides an incentive for the corporation and the
initiks to disclose important information to the public. Market regulators such as the COB
and SEC always promote the most rapid and trustworthy disclosure of information possible,
so that investors may make informed decisions. Cf. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230
(1988) (justifying extensive disclosure requirements: "there cannot be honest markets with-
out honest publicity").
139. Consider the fairness of a CEO (or other executive) who trades when he foresees
- based on his executive observations - a profitable future for his company. Naturally, a
CEO's perspective of his own company is an unfair advantage over the average investor
[Vol. 22:1
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In Babcock Fives,40 for example, the court of appeals in-
structed that privileged information must be "precise, special, and
certain."'' In the case, an officer of the company ordered his bank
to sell his shares shortly before the company announced significant
losses. 4 ' According to the court of appeals, at the time the officer
placed his order to sell, he was aware of only vague rumors within
the company.4 3 His information was not "precise, special and cer-
tain" enough to be privileged.'4 4 The officer's receipt of more spe-
cific information from the company's board of directors before the
bank actually executed the order was inconsequential; the officer
did not place his order on the basis of specific enough information
to violate Article 10-1(1).'"
In Banque de Madagascar,'6 an actuary initiated ongoing ne-
gotiations for a friendly takeover of the bank before leaving on an
extended vacation. Subsequently, the actuary bought shares in the
bank before the takeover became public knowledge. The actuary
claimed that his information was too indefinite because he did not
know both if the takeover would be successful and the actual dol-
lar amount minority shareholders would receive as a premium.
4 7
The court, focusing intensely on the actuary's 100% profit, held
that the actuary breached his duty not to trade. The court based
its holding on two considerations: first, at the time the actuary re-
ceived his information, the negotiations were likely to result in a
whose sources for speculation are indirect and frequently unreliable. A broad interpretation
of "privileged information" would virtually preclude the CEO from trading in his company's
securities altogether. Such a preclusion, however, may also provide a disincentive for the
CEO to improve his company's performance.
140. Judgment of Mar. 30, 1977, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1978 J.C.P. II No. 18,789 (lst
case).
141. Id.; see also Miller, supra note 37, § 7.16[2], at 7-38.
142. Judgment of Mar. 30, 1977, 1978 J.C.P. II at 18,789.
143. Id.
144. Id. The rumors to which the officer was exposed were fairly alarming: the company
was missing payment deadlines on loans; it was threatening to modify its corporate struc-
ture and fire a significant number of employees; and it had encountered certain problems in
the commercialization of its products. Id. The court considered these rumors, heard only by
company insiders, to be too general and imprecise to constitute inside information. Id.
145. Id. Nor did the officer withdraw his order after receiving more specific informa-
tion. The court held that the important moment with regards to possession of the inside
information is the placing of the order by the insider, rather than the execution of that
order. Id. Thus, the officer was under no duty to cancel his order to sell his shares after he
received the more specific (and therefore inside) information. Id. The court's holding in the
Babcock Fives would appear to be more forgiving than the complete abstention doctrine.





takeover; second, the premium he would command as a minority
shareholder, although unknown, was likely to be much higher than
the market price.' 8
4. Initits Externes: The Scope of the Incidental Clause
According to Article 10-1(1), any person who obtains privi-
leged information incidental to the exercise of his profession or
functions may not use that information to buy or sell on the mar-
ket. 49 The courts have broadly construed the "incidental" clause
of the statute. In P . . . Carrefour/Allobroge,'50 P, the head of an
independent architecture firm, was working with the CEO of Al-
lobroge. While in the Allobroge office building, P saw the Allobroge
CEO meeting with the CEO of a rival company.5 Based on that
sighting and on vague rumors circulating at the time, P speculated
the two companies were preparing a joint venture.152 P subse-
quently bought FF637,623 worth of stock in Allobroge. 53 Shortly
thereafter, the two companies announced the joint venture, and
Allobroge stock more than doubled in price. 5'
In. convicting P of insider trading and sentencing him to six
months in prison, the court ruled that P obtained the information
in the exercise of his profession.155 The court reasoned that P's ob-
servations and conclusions (regarding the identities and plans of
the CEOs) were only possible because P's job brought him to the
offices of Allobroge. 156
Such a broad categorization of initi~s internes produces ridic-
ulous - indeed, unenforceable - law. For example, suppose a pro-
fessional photographer takes a few pictures of the decaying physi-
cal plant at a company's main factory. With his newly acquired
knowledge, the photographer sells his stock in the company. Send-
ing such a speculator to jail would not only be absurd, but identi-
fying and apprehending such "violators" would be nearly impossi-
ble. If the P . . . Carrefour/Allobroge court had focused on a
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.









reasonable application of law rather than on P's large profits, it
may have reached a different result. Basically, the court over-
looked the obscure quality of P's information; P merely saw two
CEOs emerging from a room. This information, like that in Bab-
cock Fives, was not "precise, special and certain." ' 7 Yet, the P
... Carrefour/Allobroge result contradicts Babcock Fives.15  Of
course, the trial court heard P. . . Carrefour/Allobroge one year
before the court of appeals decided Babcock Fives. Nevertheless,
this illustrates the French judicial system's inconsistent interpreta-
tion of an imperfect statute.
Another revealing case involved a bank director who acted as
the personal account supervisor for a friend. After the friend in-
formed the bank director of his intentions to acquire control of a
certain company, the bank director purchased shares in the com-
pany. 5e According to the court, the director's acquisition of the
information was incidental to his profession rather than incidental
to his personal friendship with his client.' 6 This case, like P...
Carrefour/Allobroge, exemplifies the semantic limitations of Arti-
cle 10-1 and the concomitant judicial willingness to broaden the
statutory language. 6
C. Weaknesses of the 1970 Statute: A Summary
The 1970 Statute and the cases arising under it had three ma-
jor weaknesses: first, the absence of an explicit provision for
prohibiting the transfer and use of information by tippers and tip-
pees; second, the statute's use of the ambiguous term "exploit6;"'' 2
and third, the ineffective application of penalties for insider trad-
ing crimes.
157. Judgment of May 26, 1977, 1978 J.C.P. II at 18,789.
158. Id. (where an executive is privy to mere rumors within his company, right to trade
not barred); see supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
159. COMMISSION DES OPARATIONS DE souRsE, DixzxME RAPPORT AU PRIASJDENT DE LA Rp-
PUBLIQUE 97 (1977)) [hereinafter DIXIkME RAePoaRT.
160. Id. Of course, if the court had found that the director received the information in
his capacity as a friend, the director would have been innocent. Until 1988, French law
contained no provision criminalizing speculation by a tippee who received his information
outside the course of his profession. See infra notes 192-200 and accompanying text.
161. Hawes, supra note 37, at 345.
162. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
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1. The Tipper/Tippee Problem
The 1970 Statute specifically sanctioned persons who bought
or sold securities on the basis of information received incident to
their profession or functions,16 but made no provision to prohibit
the use and exchange of inside "tips." ' The Government, there-
fore, could only prosecute initiks internes or initi~s externes; any
other party was free to use or exchange inside information without
penalty of law.' Furthermore, the COB was frustrated in two
cases in which persons outside the statutory definition of "insid-
ers" - the son of a company president and the mother-in-law of a
company officer - bought stock the basis of information received
from their initi~s relatives.1 6 The COB lost both attempts to
prove the buyers were straw parties for the initi~s internes.1
7
Even the COB publicly acknowledged that the mere use and ex-
change of tips was legal -as long as an initi was not steering
third parties to trade on his behalf.68 The 1970 Statute's approach
to the tipper-tippee problem reflected a deeply rooted tradition in
France's business community: insiders were expected to give
friends and relatives tips, even if the insiders did not share in the
subsequent trade.16 "
163. 1970 Statute, supra note 59.
164. Thus, in the case discussed supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text, the court
could not penalize the friend/tipper, and it had to stretch Article 10-1(1) to reach the bank
director/tippee.
165. DIXIAME RAPPORT, supra note 159, at 94.
166. Id. (son case); COMMISSION DES OP9RATIONS DE BOURSE, ONZIME RAPPORT AL PRPSI-
DENT DE LA Rf:PUBLIQUE 94 (1978) (mother-in-law case) [hereinafter ONZI.ME RAPPORT].
167. ONZI ME RAPPORT, supra note 166, at 94. The 1970 Statute punished only the in-
sider who traded directly on the basis of the information or who used another person as an
intermediary. The COB frequently examined tippees to determine if, in participating in the
prohibited transaction, the tippees were really acting on behalf of the tipper. In one such
case, the mistress of a director acquired shares in a company in which the director's com-
pany was about to invest, before the director's company announced such investment plans.
The COB determined that the director and his mistress were not tipper and tippee, but
rather author of the crime and accomplice. DIXIPME RAPPORT, supra note 159, at 93. In such
a case, the COB could bring an action against both parties.
168. RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 18, at 235 (citing Small Investors Protected From
Insider Dealing, The Times, July 12, 1974); de Mahenge & Persiaux, supra note 12, at 58.
169. See RIDER & FRENCH, supra note 18. Only a small number of French companies
are publicly traded, and many officers and directors of publicly held corporations in France
know one another. Aside from attending local social and business functions, many of the
business leaders attended one of several elite French business schools. Consequently, the
French business community is a relatively intimate society where age-old traditions die
hard.
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2. The Exploit Problem
The 1970 Statute was unclear regarding the prosecution's bur-
den of proving the insider's intent to exploit privileged informa-
tion. According to the X. . .Otis Europe/Otis Elevator court, ex-
ploit6 meant only that the insider knowingly used inside
information when he initiated the transaction; whether the insider
sought financial benefit was irrelevant. 1' 0 Subsequent defendants,
however, continued to argue that the text of the statute contained
a scienter requirement and required a finding that the insider
traded with the sole purpose of speculation.' 7 1 Such a reading of
the statute would have made it much tougher to convict an insider,
since no insider in French case law has ever admitted both that he
possessed inside information and that he engaged in a market
transaction because of his inside knowledge.'1
7
3. The Enforcement Problem: Ineffective Application of Penalties
Although the 1970 Statute permitted courts to impose stiff
penalties, the French courts failed to send any guilty initiks to
jail. 173 Indeed, initi~s suffered only negligible fines.' By any stan-
dard, therefore, the convicted inside traders did not endure severe
punishment.' 5 Seemingly, the courts believed public exposure of
170. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text. Of course, X. . .Otis Europe/Otis
Elevator's persuasiveness as a trial court decision is attenuated. Subsequent appellate level
cases, however, confirmed the requirement that the insider have knowledge of confidential
information at the time of the transaction.
171. See, e.g., Judgment of Oct. 15, 1976, 1978 D.S. Jur at 384; Judgment of Mar. 30,
1979, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 1980 J.C.P. II No. 19,306 (1st case) note A. Tunc; Judgment of
Apr. 18, 1979, 1980 J.C.P. II at 19,306.
172. Miller, supra note 37, § 7.17[3], at 7-39. Instead, the insider has always proffered
an alternative explanation.
173. In fact, some courts have approved prison sentences for initiks, but those courts -
for a variety of reasons - have suspended every sentence. Miller, supra note 37, § 7.1614],
at 7-40. See, e.g., Judgment of Oct. 29, 1975, 1976 D.S. Jur. at 53 (suspended sentence of six
months); Judgment of May 12, 1976, 1976 J.C.P. II at 18,496 (1st case) (suspended sentence
of two months); Judgment of Oct. 15, 1976, 1977 J.C.P. II at 18,543 (2d Case) (suspended
sentence of three months); Id. (3d case) (suspended sentence of six months); Id. (4th case)
(suspended sentence of ten months).
174. Hawes, supra note 37, at 345 (citing A. Tunc, Insider Trading in France 5 (Oct. 30,
1980) (paper delivered at London Conference on New Trends in Company Law Disclosure)).
It was a rare case where the initib's fine was even as large as his illicit profit. Id.
175. In theory, persons suffering a loss because of an insider's illegal trading have a
right to pursue damages in the criminal courts through an "action civile." Miller, supra note
37, § 7.16[5], at 7-40. The judge would hear such an action simultaneously with the State's
"action publique." Id.
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corruption would deter further abuses (a theory abandoned by the
French Legislature in 1970.)l 'l
V. THE 1983 AMENDMENTS
Still facing rampant insider trading in 1983, the French Par-
liament adopted a comprehensive reform of Article 10-1 ("Revised
Article 10-1").'17 Revised Article 10-1 guarantees stricter penalties,
broadens the scope of privileged information, clarifies the exploitb/
criminal intent ambiguity, attempts to deal with the tipper/tippee
problem, and extends its coverage to corporations or other legal
entities.'1
7
The Revised Article 10-1 mandates that courts impose fines no
less than the profit (if any) made on the transaction. 7 ' Addition-
In practice, however, owing to the Court of Cassation's rigid requirements, only one
civilian suit has ever been attached to a criminal action. de Mahenge & Persiaux, supra note
12, at 58; Miller, supra note 37, § 7.16[5], at 7-40.
In the one such action civile to date, a financial newspaper claimed to have suffered
moral damage when an employee illegally used confidential information gained in the course
of investigative reporting and attached its suit against the employee to the criminal action.
Although the court found the defendant guilty of the crime, the court refused to award
damages in the civil action, finding no link between the crime and the alleged moral damage
to the newspaper. Judgment May 12, 1976, 1976 J.C.P. II at 18,496; see supra notes 114-19
and accompanying text. But cf. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), af'g 791
F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986) (court of appeals held that defendant reporter had a duty to the
newspaper, breached that duty by leaking information to traders, and therefore violated
Rule 10b-5).
COB investigations and reports, however, have induced some private settlements out of
court. In these, the insider has relinquished his profit and compensated the injured party.
COMMISSION DES OPgRATIONS DE BOURSE, HUITI9ME RAPPORT AU PRPSIDENT DE LA RPUBLIQUE
99 (1975).
176. See supra text accompanying note 58.
177. Law No. 83-1, art. 35 (Jan. 3, 1983), 1983 J.O. 162, 1983 D.S.L. 95 (replacing Arti-
cle 10-1, supra note 60) [hereinafter Revised Article 10-1].
178. Other than the additions or revisions explicitly addressed in this Comment, Re-
vised Article 10-1 duplicates the original Article 10-1. See Article 10-1, supra note 60; Re-
vised Article 10-1, supra note 177.
179. Before the 1983 amendments, thirteen of fourteen cases resulted in fines lower
than the illegally obtained profits. Moreover, many of the fines were outrageously low rela-
tive to the profits. See, e.g., Judgment of Oct. 15, 1976, 1977 J.C.P. II at 18,543 (3d case)
(profits over FF100,000 but a fine of only FF20,000).
The 1983 amendments, mandating increased fines, had an immediate effect on court
sentencing. In Poron, a January 1985 case, the initi6 bought FF97,950 worth of stock while
in possession of insider information. Poron still held the stock when the COB started its
investigation, and never sold it thereafter. Even if Poron had sold the stock at its subse-
quent peak, he would have realized a profit of only FF19,000. The court actually fined him
over four times that amount (FF80,000). See Judgment of Jan. 28, 1985, 1985 D.S. Jur. at
358.
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ally, Revised Article 10-1 raises the minimum alternative fine from
FF5,000 to FF6,000.'8 0 Presumably, this measure was a response to
criticism that the court's meager fines lacked deterrent effect.'8
Revised Article 10-1 extends the scope of privileged informa-
tion beyond that of the 1970 Statute and its case law. Under the
1970 Statute, privileged information concerned the "technical,
commercial or financial operations of the issuer."' Revised Article
10-1 reaches all information "on the prospect or situation of an
issuer of securities, or on the prospective evolution of a transfera-
ble security."' 88 This new definition reflects legislative recognition
that securities have a commercial existence separate from their is-
suers. 84 Taken literally, however, Revised Article 10-1 may impose
abstention on analysts whose jobs require monitoring general mar-
ket conditions, government intervention, and/or other external de-
velopments.' 85 French case law has not yet delineated the actual
scope of Revised Article 10-i's privileged information clause.
Revised Article 10-1 also recognized a doctrine already evident
in some of the French jurisprudence: the absence of a scienter re-
quirement in Article 10-1(1). As discussed above, one interpreta-
tion of the previous text of Article 10-1(1) was that unless the ini-
tik exploited the privileged information for financial benefit, he
was not guilty of insider trading. 88 Although the courts generally
rejected this interpretation, defendants continued to advance it.8 "
Finally, after twelve years of silence, the legislature confirmed the
view of the bench by prohibiting insiders "to engage, or knowingly
permit others to engage. . . in one or more operations on the basis
180. Revised Article 10-1, supra note 177, para. 1.
181. de Vigneral/Compagnie de navigation fruitiere, the sole pre-1983 case in which a
French court levied a fine superior to the amount earned by the insider, was heralded as a
breakthrough by noted French commentator Andre Tunc. Judgment of Oct. 26, 1979, Trib.
corr., Paris, 1981 J.C.P. II No. 19,518 note A. Tunc. Professor Tunc referred to the fine in
that case as a true "punishment" in contrast to the mere "confiscations" of other cases. Id.
182. Article 10-1(1), supra note 71.
183. Revised Article 10-1, supra note 177.
184. de Mahenge & Persiaux, supra note 12.
185. For example, a securities analyst might discover through market research into ob-
scure but non-confidential data, that Yoplait, a French yogurt manufacturer, was about to
go bankrupt. He would consequently have information regarding the "prospective evolution
of" BSN Gervais-Danone, Inc.'s securities (since BSN is Danon yogurt's parent company).
As a result, Revised Article 10-1 could preclude the analyst from investing in BSN Gervais-
Danone until the information about Yoplait was publicized. See supra note 40.
186. See supra notes 93-95.
187. See Judgment of Oct. 29, 1975, 1976 D.S. Jur. at 55; see also supra notes 86-96
and accompanying text.
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of the above-mentioned information .... "-181 This language -
more relaxed than the exploit6 provision of the preempted statute
- seemingly quashes further argument regarding an Article 10-
1(1) scienter requirement.'1 9
Lastly, Revised Article 10-1 specifies that insider trading
prohibitions also include "moral persons" (e.g., companies, part-
nerships, or trusts).,9 0 If such an entity commits a trading viola-
tion, then its managers (legal or de facto) will be liable for the
crime as if they had personally committed it.""'
VI. ARTICLE 10-3
In 1988, the French Parliament passed Article 10-3, which
sanctions "any person who, directly or through an intermediary,
has wilfully carried out, or tried to carry out on the securities, fu-
tures, or options markets, acts aimed at influencing the normal
functioning of the market through the deception of another."'
9 2
Article 10-3 is significant in its additions to the regulation of every-
day insider trading and to the tipper-tippee situation. Under Arti-
cle 10-3, any person holding confidential information regarding a
particular transaction is under an obligation to refrain from acting
on it.'9 ' The prosecution must show, however, that the non-insider
had a wrongful intention (scienter). Article 10-3's scienter require-
ment manifests a policy judgment that non-insiders should be
outside the presumption of wrongful intent.
Article 10-3 requires proof that the individual tipper or tippee
intended to disrupt the level playing field by the use and exchange
of inside information. The case against a tippee is less complicated:
if the tippee possessed inside information at the time he traded,
and there was no overriding reason for the tippee to trade in the
188. New Article 10-1, supra note 177 (emphasis added).
189. Poron was the first published opinio*n in which the defendant did not raise the
absence-of-criminal-intent defense. Judgment of Jan. 28, 1985, 1985 D.S. Jur. at 357.
190. New Article 10-1, supra note 177, para. 1.
191. Id.
192. Article 10-3, supra note 10. Article 10-3 applies the same penalties as Article 10-1.
Under Article 10-3, the state prosecutor must seek the opinions of the COB and market
regulators before initiating the lawsuit. In private cases, the trial judge must request the
opinions of the COB and market regulators before reaching a decision. Id.
193. Article 10-3, supra note 10; de Mahenge & Persiaux, supra note 12, at 58. As dis-
cussed supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text, Article 10-1 only applied to the stipulated
insiders - initi6s internes and initi~s externes.
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particular corporation's stock, 1 9  the court can find scienter. The
case against the tipper, however, presents greater difficulties for
the prosecution: the tipper could always claim that he was merely
indiscreet, that he had no knowledge of the tippee's intention to
trade on the basis of the disclosed information.
In the early months of 1989, when investigators unveiled the
Pechiney scandal,' 5 Article 10-3 emerged from its infancy to be-
come a functional statute. Neither Pelat nor Theret - the princi-
pal culprits - were statutory insiders; in fact, the COB's report
alleged that Theret received the inside information from a tipper
inside the French Government. ' Thus, where Theret and Pelat
held confidential information which they failed to disclose before
buying securities and thereby intended to realize an illicit profit,
they disrupted the "normal functioning of the market."
Unfortunately, Article 10-3 was powerless as applied to the
government tipper. Without extremely convincing proof of the tip-
per's wrongful intent an action against the tipper would fail. Most
probably, the COB and the Government were reluctant to expose a
fellow government official without conclusive proof that the official
violated the statute. In any event, neither the COB nor the govern-
ment prosecutor ever identified Theret's tipper.' 7
To critics of the French securities industry, this was unaccept-
able. While President Mitterand was making public statements
condemning "takeover mania," the COB appeared inept.19" Every-
one knew that at least on tipper in the Government was involved,
but investigators seemed to willfully discover nothing.' 99 French
194. Wrongful intention would be even easier to prove if the tippee was not a regular
participant in the stock market or was a relative of the tipper.
195. The COB published the report of its investigation on February 1, 1989. Baum-
gardner, SEC/COB Agreements; The French Perspective, N.Y.L.J. June 21, 1990, at 6, col.
6. In the history of the COB, this was the first time the COB had released the results of such
an investigation to the public. Id. The report was published in Le Figaro. Le Figaro, Feb. 1,
1989, at V-VI. See also Scandal, supra note 4; Financier Theret Indicted in French Insider
Trading Row, Reuter Bus. Rep., Mar. 3, 1989, at 1 (NEXIS, omni library).
196. Scandal, supra note 4. Pechiney was a government-owned company pursuing a
takeover of U.S.-based Triangle Industries.
197. Id.; see also Lever, SEC Probe Causes Flap in France, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 10, 1989, at
8.
198. Phillips, The French Evolution, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 1989, at 3 (int'l ed.)
(NEXIS, omni library). Criticism of the COB's impotence was widespread and harsh. See,
e.g., Le Figaro/L'Actualit6, Jan. 10, 1989, at I, col. 1; La COB: Un Gendarme sans Baton, Le
Figaro, Jan. 19, 1989, at III, col. 5; Le Figaro, Jan. 19, 1989, at I, col. 3.
199. In the wake of the scandal, one Finance Ministry aide resigned but was never in-
dicted. Lever, supra note 197. Once again, the French Government confirmed the public's
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law was inadequate; without potent legislation, the COB had a lim-
ited capability to regulate. One observer commented that while
"[t]he SEC terrorizes the actors on Wall Street[,] . .. the COB
does not really frighten anyone in Paris.
2 0 0
VII. THE 1989 AMENDMENT
Responding to the Pechiney scandal, the Socialist Government
won approval for Law No. 89-531 (the "1989 Amendment"),201
which increased the COB's power of investigation and dealt more
directly with the tipper problem.2 02 The law inserts a paragraph
between paragraphs 1 and 2 of Revised Article 10-1. The new para:
graph imposes criminal sanctions "on anyone who, in the course of
his profession or function holds privileged information on the fu-
ture or present situation of an issuer, or the future evolution of a
security or negotiable option, and communicates that information
to a third party outside the normal course of his profession or his
functions."20 Thus, the 1989 Amendment appears even more po-
tent than U.S. law on the tipper situation: on its face, the statute
does not require the French prosecutor to show scienter, a fiduci-
ary duty of confidentiality to an employer, or an ensuing trade
based on the information.
2 0 4
If properly enforced, the 1989 Amendment will revolutionize
the conduct of French insiders. As recently as January 1989, com-
mentators complained that "[flar too long insider trading has been
going on in France unchecked. It's been very much a domestic
game. 212 5 The 1989 Amendment, however, provides a relatively
mild punishment for its violators. While other insider traders are
punishable by two months to two years in jail and a fine of
FF6,000 to FF10 million (and/or up to ten times the profit real-
perception of the Government's nonchalant attitude towards insider trading. Id; Baum-
gardner, supra note 195.
200. Le Figaro/L'Actualit6, Jan. 10, 1989, at I, col. 1.
201. Law No. 89-531, art. 8 (Aug. 2, 1989) 1989 D.S.L. 266 (amending Revised Article
10-1, supra note 177) [hereinafter 1989 Amendment).
202. Baumgardner, supra note 195, at 7, col. 1.
203. 1989 Amendment, supra note 20.
204. Id. Some commentators have expressed the opinion that the 1989 Amendment
contains a mental element: that "[tihe accused must know that he has communicated privi-
leged information to be convicted." Petersen, Insider Dealing in France: Beefing up the
COB, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 1990, at 34. Such a mental element, however, falls far short of
requiring the prosecutor to show scienter, fiduciary duty, or an ensuing trade based on the
communicated information.
205. Neher, supra note 8.
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ized), 08 violators of the 1989 Amendment are punishable by a
mere one to six months in jail and/or a fine of FF10,000 to
FF100,000. 07 The more lenient treatment of tippers reflects the
constrained ability to prove a tipper's intent.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In recent years, the French have made some progress in devel-
oping a law to eradicate insider trading. The 1989 Amendment
should finally inhibit the rampant exchange of inside tips that ex-
isted in the past. Article 10-3, on the other hand, may be somewhat
less successful. It creates a cause of action against anyone who acts
to influence the "normal functioning of the market" through the
"deception of another."0" Although the Article permits the Gov-
ernment to prosecute non-statutory insiders where the Govern-
ment can show scienter, '09 the statute is unable to reach news re-
porters or others who trade based on the probable effect of their
own published articles, if these articles contain truthful and non-
confidential information."" In such a scenario, the information is
true and accessible to the public, thus there is no deception.
Amending Article 10-3 so that it prohibits "acts wrongfully aimed
at influencing the normal functioning of the market" would elimi-
nate the "deception of another" loophole. Lastly, if the French are
truly serious about eliminating insider trading in their markets,
they must re-adopt a statute similar to Section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act and improve the COB's physical resources to handle
the increased workload that would ensue. Section 16, particularly
Section 16(b), is simple to administer and easy for market partici-
pants to understand; questions such as materiality, scienter, causa-
tion, and reliance do not arise. 211 By completely prohibiting short
term speculation by insiders, Section 16(b) is also efficient.212 The
206. The 1989 Amendment raised the maximum fines. 1989 Amendment, supra note
201. The previous alternative maximums were FF5 million or four times the profit realized.
See Revised Article 10-1, supra note 177. The 1989 Amendment also empowered the COB
to obtain court orders for search and seizure operations carried out pursuant to COB inves-
tigations. 1989 Amendment, supra note 201.
207. 1989 Amendment, supra note 201.
208. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 193-97.
210. See supra note 119.
211. See RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 18, at 46.
212. Id. Due to its purely objective criteria, extensive, probing investigations are
unnecessary.
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United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit once ex-
plained Section 16(b)'s raison d'etre:
Commonly termed a "crude rule of thumb," the statute seeks to
prevent insiders from realizing profits on securities held for
short periods of time. It is not aimed solely at the actuality of
evil, or the veritable employment of inside information for
purely speculative purposes, but also at the potentiality for evil
inherent in all insider short-swing trading.21
The original Article 162-1, France's one-time counterpart to
Section 16(b), failed for two reasons: 1) the absence of a statutory
cause of action against the violators and 2) a severe manpower
shortage at the COB, exacerbated by Article 162-i's requiring ini-
tis internes to file reports on all their trading.2 14 A new counter-
part to Section 16(b) should include several provisions. First, the
statute must provide a cause of action (like Section 16(b)'s dis-
gorgement of profits requirement) for the shareholders of the is-
suer against the violators. This is even more crucial in France than
in the United States because the French tradition of condoning in-
sider trading would make French corporations less likely to take
private action against the violators. Second, the statute should fol-
low Section 16(b)'s example in requiring the insiders of an issuer to
file only the records of their transactions in that issuer's securities.
Third, the COB - which currently has less than one-tenth of the
SEC's budget and staff - must receive the appropriations neces-
sary to significantly improve and enlarge its resources.
The French have reached a turning point in the regulation of
insider trading. Before 1967, insider trading was virtually an ac-
cepted practice. Subsequently, from 1967 until 1989, the French
Parliament adopted legislation with the ostensible goal of creating
a fair, honest market, but only a few violators were convicted. To-
day, however, the convergence of world markets demands a more
aggressive response to securities corruption. Largely due to the
Pechiney scandal, both the French public and the international in-
vestment community have acknowledged the French deficiencies.
In turn, French lawmakers have begun to appreciate the impor-
tance of effective securities regulations21a As the 1992 European
213. Newmark v. R.K.O. Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 350-51 (2d Cir. 1970) (emphasis
added).
214. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
215. See Insider Trading Developments, Fin. Reg. Rep., June 1990 (NEXIS, omni
library).
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commercial unification approaches, much of the necessary legal
framework is in place. With a few adjustments, including a Section
16-type statute and an increased commitment to the COB, the
French may be within reach of a legitimate, trustworthy securities
exchange.2 10
216. Pursuant to the 1989 Amendment, which granted the COB specific powers to issue
insider trading regulations subject to the approval of the Minister of Finance, the COB
recently issued six new regulations relating to the issue of privileged information. The most
important aspect of these new regulations is a definition of the term itself. For this purpose,
"privileged information" is information not in the public domain, which is precise and con-
cerns one or more issuers, securities, futures, or listed 'financial products' and which if made
public, could produce an effect on the trading or situation of the security, future or 'finan-
cial product' concerned." The regulations further provide for new procedure, "rescrit,"
whereby the COB may be consulted in advance on whether a certain action is permissible.
(This procedure is the French equivalent of the SEC no-action letters). These reforms, if
properly implemented, should provide to the players of the French financial markets greater
certainty on the precise bounds of both insider information and insider dealing.
Lastly, the regulations permit the COB to impose limited financial sanctions on viola-
tors of the insider trading statutes without recommending that such violators be prosecuted
in the courts. Jean Saint-Geours, the newly appointed chairman of the COB, explained:
"The COB's power to inflict financial sanctions allows us to escape from the all or nothing
dilemma. In France, it is very serious to transmit a case to the law courts. It is considered a
sign of infamy, so much so that the COB has often been accused of not being willing to take
this step and so appeared to be doing nothing. In this perspective, the fine is a very useful
intermediate sanction." Graham, Sanctions to protect-The COB has been given greater
powers, Fin. Times, Oct. 22, 1990, at VIII. Mr. Saint-Geours' attitude, however, appears in
line with the old-fashion French view that insider trading is not a serious crime; until such
attitudes are changed, the French financial markets will be suspect to international and
small investors.
